On the Causes of Crisis Phenomena in the Nuclear Complex of Ukraine

In February 2003, I published an article named “A Complex of Nuclear Hazards” in the newspaper “Kyivskyy Telegraf”, in which I familiarized the community with certain problems in this field and my vision of their solution. Considering that the said issues are of strategic nature and directly concern not only the energetic safety of our country, but also the assurance of health and safe living conditions for millions of people as well as conservation of environment, I repeatedly published materials on this topic afterwards as well.

What is the state of affairs at the present moment? First of all, absence of a legislatively approved national nuclear policy and strategy of the fuel and energy complex development in the outlook serves as evidence of the fact that officials responsible for the fuel and energy complex are thinking about their armchairs instead of their country. And they are unwilling to see any further.

On 15 March 2006, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted an Energetic Strategy of Ukraine for the period until 2030. Work on the said document has been conducted for more than five years already, with every “amended edition” representing a virtually brand-new project. It is peculiar, though, that every time the representatives of developers and customers of the document proclaim it to be “profoundly based on science”, and its criticism – as “incompetent” and “prejudiced”. At the same time, it is being bashfully concealed that if the project were indeed so good, the National Energetic Strategy would not have to be rewritten so many times. Still more important is the fact that any governmental strategy in a constitutional state cannot in principle substitute the state laws and must be approved by the Supreme Council. And then we shall see to what extent its regulations will concur with the real life of the country.

However, the government is already making haste. An “advance division” of enormous financial resources is already declared: although no national priorities exist so far in the development of nuclear power engineering from the legal point of view, a detailed financial plan for years 2006-2030 has nevertheless been already adopted in the amount of 250,254 billion (!!) UAH!

This fully justifies the statement which I made yet several years ago, that such an irresponsible approach towards the strategically essential trend in the country’s energetic safety may result in a spontaneous formation of the long-term strategy of nuclear power engineering development – under the influence of circumstances or the current situation.

As a human being, I can understand my yesterday’s colleagues who helped me prevent the possibility of launching the unfinished power-generating unit of the Khmelnytsk nuclear power plant timed to the birthday of president Leonid Kuchma in August 2004. As a citizen, I fail to understand the “energetic populism” accompanying the election by way of routine strategies. The only good news is the appearance of Minister of Economy, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who frankly admitted that the crude document in question was actually “hanging in the air”. When doing this, he did not relate either to the energetic strategy of the European Union or to that of Russia. All this happened against the background of frustrated execution of the National Energetic Programme of Ukraine until year 2010 (NEP-2010) adopted in May 1996 (note that regardless of the above, the state of execution of the NEP-2010 tasks has never (!) been evaluated by either current or previous members of the CMU)!

One cannot help noticing that present-day Ukraine is lacking a clear-cut governmental policy in the field of nuclear power utilization, as well as an efficient functional structure of management in this sphere. The saddest thing is the absence of our officials’ responsibility for the non-compliance with the nuclear legislation. All this is accompanied by a plentiful flourishing of unprofessionalism, lobbying of commercial interests and the desire to “creatively appropriate” money through the construction of nuclear hazardous objects.

In spite of the tremendous potential in nuclear power engineering, inherited by Ukraine after the collapse of USSR, it would be a great exaggeration to assert that we possess an integral interconnected system, resistant to external influence and capable of independent development (i.e. a complex in the proper meaning of the word). Here lies one of the essential points that distinguishes the nuclear power engineering of Ukraine from other segments of our domestic fuel and energy complex.

The development level of Ukrainian nuclear power engineering does not correspond to the state of other components in the nuclear industry and scientific-and-technological potential of our country in the said sphere. Since the dissolution of USSR, not only the centres of scientific-research, experimental-design and technical support of the nuclear branch, but also reactor plants, and chiefly, almost all enterprises of the nuclear-and-fuel cycle have remained beyond the borders of Ukraine.

In essence, Ukraine has become a hostage of its nuclear power engineering development. And solution of problems in this field will, without overstatement, predetermine the destiny of this country.

Unfortunately, I am compelled to acknowledge that the officials’ practice of ignoring the actually existing problems of strategic nature and following the principle “After us the deluge!”, which took shape in the course of several years, persists in reality until nowadays. Freedom of speech and removal of taboos from a whole range of previously forbidden subjects, granted as a consequence of the “Orange” revolution, have nevertheless failed to lead us to a condition where authority would become more transparent, and techniques applied by it – more comprehensible. Just as before, our authority neither reacts to the public opinion, nor takes it into account in its activities, nor enters into polemics with it when necessary.

Many officials still consider democratic procedures as nothing more than a formal, purely ritual phenomenon. In their opinion, it has no practical application and is “compensated” by the fact that every person invested with real authority also enjoys the “inalienable freedom” to ignore this public opinion – unless the said “opinion” issues from the administration or certain “groups of influence” who are able to make themselves heard. That is, however, only half the trouble. Much worse is the case of ignoring the requirements of legislation that concern the interests of millions of people.

A countless multitude of fine-sounding and, for the most part, essentially fair words have been said about “reformation”, “strengthening”, “reinforcement”, “protection” etc. of nuclear power independence and safety in Ukraine. However, no progress has been made from words not only to accomplished actions, but even simply to concrete normative and regulatory documents. It was by no chance that the Ministry of Fuel and Energy never succeeded in forwarding a single draft law of any importance on the matters of nuclear power engineering and industry to the Supreme Council!

Instead of a policy of thoroughly weighed practical steps in the power engineering field, wide application has been gained by the practice of declarations and pompous phrases. All this happened against the background of systematic scandals and multiple crisis events in various branches of the fuel and energy complex.

However, everybody must be clearly aware of the following: combinations of inane slogans like “Economy should save our energy” and poorly thought-out, in the aspect of consequences, decisions taken in the corridors and costing up to hundreds of millions and billions of dollars will by no means improve the situation.

Unfortunately, present managers of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy find no time for doing so. As shown by the analysis of the state of problems in nuclear power engineering, many of them have to await their solution for years – regardless of numerous instructions from the top executives of the country. The problem of creating a nuclear and fuel cycle in Ukraine may serve as an example. Since the moment of its setting in 1994, it has been four times considered as one of the most important trends in the presidential decrees and governmental regulations, and still not much has changed here up to this day. Contrarily, all the crisis situations which it turned out more or less possible to solve were “adjusted” by the executive authorities solely due to pressure from the Supreme Council Committee of Ukraine on the Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety.

According to our calculations, no more than about 30 % of instructions of the President and government of Ukraine with regard to nuclear subjects have been carried out to a lesser or greater extent within the recent years. Scarcely anything has changed under the last two governments, either. I shall quote an example: on 13.05.2005, President Viktor Yushchenko gave a commission to Ivan Plachkov and David Zhvaniya to ascertain the results of the study of situation in the sphere of observing the legislation on radioactive waste (RAW) handling, conducted by a working team of the Supreme Council Committee of Ukraine on the Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety: “Hereby I request to draw up, within a 10 days’ period, coordinated suggestions in the form of draft resolutions. Report must be given within 10 days”. Unfortunately, no draft resolutions for the concerned questions have arrived from the Ministry of Fuel and Energy into the Emergency Control Ministry until the present day.

On 14.06.2005, having acquainted himself with a full-scale analysis of the state of affairs in the nuclear industry, sent to him by the Supreme Council Committee of Ukraine on the Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety, the President of Ukraine ordered, in another of his commissions:

"Y. Tymoshenko

It is necessary to carefully analyze, jointly with the Supreme Council Committee of Ukraine, the complex of posed problems in nuclear power engineering as well as to determine the measures for their settlement.

To be reported until 1 July 2005.

P. A. Poroshenko
I request to prepare the question for consideration at a meeting of the National Safety and Defense Council of Ukraine."

And here it is worth mentioning that the President’s commission has never been implemented.

On 27.12.2005, the President of Ukraine issued a Decree “Decision of the National Safety and Defense Council of Ukraine dated 9 December 2005 “On the State of Energetic Safety in Ukraine and Basic Principles of Governmental Policy in the Field of its Assurance”, ratifying a number of measures designed for securing the energetic safety of Ukraine. These measures also contain questions related to the nuclear power engineering and industry. Alas, a part of the planned arrangements is rather founded on lobbying motives, i.e. serves for the satisfaction of specific private interests instead of the solution of strategic problems in the field (such is, for example, the creation of “Ukratomprom”).

Besides, certain clauses therein simply contradict the procedures of decision-making established by the legislation of Ukraine for this type of questions. Among them is the “construction of storage facilities for the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) of Rivne, Khmelnytsk and South-Ukrainian atomic power stations (APS)” (term of execution – 2006-2010). At the same time, a whole series of such truly fundamental questions as creation of a mechanism for filling the fund for removal of APS from service are lacking a definite term of realization (although a similar fund should have existed for a long time). Furthermore, some of them (like creation of a fund for RAW handling) were not included into the list of arrangements at all! In fact, to understand that the situation with RAW is indeed critical, it would quite suffice to cast a glance at the “Radon” of Kyiv and Lviv, industrial unit “Pavlograd Chemical Plant” (PKhZ) and other enterprises in the field.

Hardly anybody pays attention also to the fact that the government, ministries and administrations hesitate for years before bringing their normative and regulatory acts into conformity with the current legislation. Sometimes they simply ignore its requirements. It is no wonder that acuteness of problems in the nuclear power engineering does not subside.

The problem of Chernobyl APS deserves, of course, some special attention. It must be honestly admitted that in several aspects, the state of things with the liquidation of the aftermaths of Chernobyl nuclear disaster is not only far from improving, but even on the contrary, deteriorating. The programme of creating facilities for the long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel of the station is completely wrecked. The latest annual report published by the State Atomic Regulation Agency of Ukraine (dated 16 August 2005) even informs about a disruption of works for an “indefinite period”. This is also accompanied by the occurrence of additional losses and the growth of operating expenses.

Doubtlessly, all this outrage could come into existence only under the conditions of flagrant legal nihilism demonstrated by the Cabinet of Ministers and passivity of the law-enforcement bodies. It is absolutely impossible to ensure the protection of society from nuclear and radioactive threat without fulfilling the legislative requirements. As regards the “project of construction of RAW storage-2” at the Chernobyl APS, these requirements were violated from the outset.

As early as on 18 March 1997, when the Supreme Council of Ukraine ratified the “Grant Agreement (Project of Nuclear Safety at the Chernobyl APS) between the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as the administrator of resources assigned, according to the grant, from the account of nuclear safety, the government of Ukraine and the Chernobyl atomic power station” by Regulation No. 146/97, the Cabinet of Ministers was strongly urged to “consider the questions of subsequent attraction of funds pursuant to Memorandum on the Shutdown of the Chernobyl APS only on condition of removal of the Chernobyl APS from service”. But this instruction was not carried out. Moreover, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy has failed to present anything intelligible in the course of 8 years. The energy administration conducted yearlong negotiations with companies vying for the victory in tenders, the Chernobyl APS signed contracts, and all of this took place in overt defiance of the perfectly specific instruction given by the top legislative authority of the country.

At present, the Chernobyl station is being “patronized” by the Emergency Control Ministry. However, immersed in the commercialization of relationships in the sphere of emergency situations, the very management of this Ministry leads the solution of questions associated with the problems of Chernobyl APS as well as assurance of radioactive and nuclear safety of the country into a blind alley.

The content of the Draft Law of Ukraine “Nationwide Programme of Removal of the Chernobyl APS from Service and Transformation of the “Shelter” Object into an Ecologically Safe System”, submitted to the Supreme Council literally a few days ago, provokes numerous enquiries from the specialists. In my opinion, it will also become an object of close attention among the People’s Deputies of the already new convocation. However, at the very first sight this document clearly appears somewhat different from what Ukraine expected. In particular, the make-up of the programme comprises largely ineffective, from the viewpoint of set goals, but at the same time rather costly arrangements. As may be seen, the many year-old traditions of budgetary funds “appropriation” have not been eradicated up to nowadays…

Such logic is not susceptible of objective analysis, especially since even the state regulating authority has neither seen (!) nor endorsed the said programme. The Emergency Control Ministry simply pushed a “convenient” project by way of corridor-talk through the CMU.

Nowadays, it is exactly the standpoint taken by the management of the Emergency Control Ministry that thwarts negotiations with the EBRD concerning the Chernobyl APS along with the onset of their financing of the construction project of “new secure confinement” (i.e. the “Arch” above the “Shelter” object). One may suppose that such an irresponsible policy of the Ministry will result, at best, in a “delayed decision” of EBRD as to financing the construction of this object. In the worst case, it will altogether deter the bank and donors from financing. This will be caused by the inability of Ukrainian officials to work in accordance with European procedures, which the EBRD uses in its projects.

We are obviously facing a dead end, and a scandalous one at that. We may only hope that our President and Prime-Minister have been misinformed by Mr. Baloga and Mr. Parashin, and are unaware of the true motives of their “commercial activity” for the protection of the national interests of Ukraine. Though frankly speaking, even if we do not give a damn about the problems of safe living conditions and environment of our citizens, at least the instinct of self-preservation must function in our Minister for the “Creation of Emergency Situations”. Or, maybe, the “gassy heroism” of Ivchenko and Plachkov taught him nothing?

It is necessary to thoroughly analyze the efficiency of application of the proposed procedures in specific directions of work. This particularly concerns powers, responsibility, subordination and financing mechanisms of project management teams at the Chernobyl APS. Hardly justifiable is the present-day practice, according to which financial documents for the allocation of funds are signed by the Station Director, who exerts no influence on the formation of tasks and verification of their expediency. Even more so since a considerable part of his subordinates, involved in the said projects, receive a “parallel salary” either from the EBRD or from foreign contractors of the Chernobyl APS. Let alone the desirability of tax payment from the additional earnings…

A lot of questions also emerge in connection with efficiency and competence of the contractors’ work in the key objects of the Chernobyl station. For example:

— construction of a dry depository for spent nuclear fuel (DDSNF) at the Chernobyl APS. Contractor – Framatom. Onset of works – July 1999. Pursuant to the Contract, the object must be erected prior to March 2003. Original cost of works – over 52 mln. EUR and $ 18,5 mln. Subsequent cost including adjustments (in total 7 adjustments) – over 72,5 mln. EURO and almost $ 19,5 mln. The term of object commissioning was postponed to 21.08.2005. Nevertheless, as early as in April 2003 works for the project realization were suspended. This was caused by imperfections in the project and impossibility of its licensing by the State Nuclear Regulation Committee (SNRC) of Ukraine.

Present offers of the contractor:

— augmentation of the cost of works by 80 mln. EURO;

— prolongation of the contract period by 52 months (until 2010);

— industrial complex for the handling of solid RAW.

Contractor — RWE NUKEN GmbH. Designed term of project realization: March 2001 – March 2004. Latest completion of construction works was postponed to 25.07.2006. Delay in execution – 29 months. Cost – 47 mln. EURO, including 44 mln. EURO for Euro-Commission and 3 mln. 422 ths. EURO for Ukraine. Works executed to the amount of 19 mln. 460 ths. EURO. Paid 22 mln. 429 ths. EURO, including: advance – 8 mln. 730 ths. EURO (EC – 19 mln. 889 ths. EURO and Ukraine – 2 mln. 540 ths. EURO). At present, the residue of advance payment is uncovered by the acts of executed works to the sum of almost 3 mln. EURO.

— Plant for radioactive effluent processing. Contractor — Consortium Belgatom, SGN, Ansaldo Nucleare. Terms of contract performance: original date – before 23.08.2001. Collateral agreement No. 7 — 21.09.2007 (prolonged by 73 months).

Contract value: original — 17 mln. 400 ths. EURO.

Collateral agreement No. 7 — 32,5 mln. EURO (increase by 87 %).

In general, the efficiency of using financial aid granted by the international community to Ukraine for the solution of problems with the Chernobyl APS gives rise to a host of questions, one of which sounds as follows: what if this station is simply utilized by the contractors, international superintendents and Ukrainian “competent managers” for the purpose of “appropriating” the money allotted by the donor countries? Doesn’t it turn out that certain procedures, imposed in their time upon Ukraine and accepted at the Chernobyl APS, permit to ineffectively use the funds arriving from donor countries?

Both we and our foreign friends would like to receive irrefragable and satisfactory answers to all these questions on the threshold of the 20th anniversary of Chernobyl disaster. This would enable us to finally develop an effective mechanism, capable of eliminating the problems presented by disaster consequences. This mechanism, however, can be only created by means of negotiations, and not of scandals or foolish unprofessional accusations.

The situation is further aggravated because heaps of current problems have forced the question of strategic guidelines in the development of nuclear power engineering to actually shift into the background. This accounted for the absence of synchronization between the scopes of adopted programmes and the objective financial possibilities of Ukraine. In these affairs, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, Ministry of Finance and CMU are generally stuck in a blind alley. Even the opportunity of receiving a credit from EBRD for the Modernization and Safety Enhancement at the Ukrainian power-generating units of APS has not been properly realized due to the trite inability to figure out who is the “boss in the finance flow”.

Serious anxiety is called forth by the state of the normative and legal field in which the nuclear power engineering exists. Thus, it is lacking a mechanism for the implementation of provisions of the Law of Ukraine “Nuclear Power Utilization and Radiological safety”, referring to the accumulation and distribution of financial resources for the removal of APS from service and the socio-economic development of territories surrounding the APS. Legislative base in the aspect of taxation of the nuclear power engineering objects is not brought into accord with the provisions of Article 33 of the Law of Ukraine “Nuclear Power Utilization and Radiological safety” as well as Law of Ukraine “Permissive Activity in the Sphere of Nuclear Power Utilization”, which stipulate for the inclusion of the electrical energy of expenses, generated by the National Atomic Power-Generating Company “Energoatom” and related to the enhancement of security at nuclear plants, their removal from service and preservation, into the prime cost.

Further, it is well-known that the policy of European integration proclaimed by the President of Ukraine also presumes conformity of all branches of the Ukrainian economy (including nuclear power engineering) with the standards of the European Union. In this connection, it appears quite possible that insufficient attention towards the problems of safe APS operation, modernization and maintenance of the existing station systems on the necessary level may lead to a situation in which we shall be compelled (for both political and “certification” reasons) to shut down ALL the functioning power units irrespective of their residual life and constructive perfection. Thus, the risk of pre-schedule removal from service of one of the power-generating units at the South-Ukrainian APS (in view of problems with the reactor body) has already sprung up.

Taking into account the specific gravity (roughly 50 %, with prospect of increment) occupied by nuclear power generation in the national power engineering, such a situation may threaten Ukraine with an economic and social catastrophe. That is why we would like to acquire some ideas as to how the management of NAPGC “Energoatom” and the Ministry of Fuel and Energy are intending to solve this problem under the conditions of unavailability of an integral realistic programme for the modernization of power units and chronic under-financing of works related to ensuring the nuclear and radiological safety.

Exposed to a most serious pressure of international institutes, which really dread the ability of our nuclear engineers to keep the peaceful atom under control, the CMU approved, by its Regulation dated 29.08.2002 No. 504-ð, the “Complex Programme of Modernization and Safety Enhancement in the Power-Generating Units of Atomic Stations”.

Carrying-out of the programme arrangements was aimed at the solution of several tasks, the main of which consisted in the following:

— elimination of the existing problems of APS safety, deviation from the national normative and regulatory acts coming into effect after the commissioning of the functioning power units and/or abatement of the influence of these deviations on safety by means of introducing compensatory measures;

— performance of obligations assumed by Ukraine as per the Nuclear Safety Convention and fulfillment of the recommendations of IAEA with respect to enhancement of security at APS with reactors of the ÂÂÅÐ-type;

— conducting an analysis of safety in the APS power units and using it as the basis for improving the safety and reliability of equipment, building structures and APS installations with its subsequent maintenance on the proper level.

Execution of the programme was calculated for the period of 2002-2005.

Control and organization of the programme execution in compliance with the regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers was entrusted to the Ministry of Fuel and Energy. NAPGC “Energoatom” was appointed as the responsible executor of the programme.

Irresponsible attitude of officials on various levels of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy and NAPGC “Energoatom” towards the implementation of a strategically important programme approved by regulation of the government has resulted in a failure to carry out the planned arrangements in any of the preceding years. On average, their annual rate of execution did not go beyond 20-30 % of the planned level, and as per the indices of years 2002-2005 – beyond 33 % of the planned level.

My repeated appeals to the top officials of the state concerning the non-fulfillment of a programme presenting vital importance for the assurance of safety in the functioning power units came to no avail. This prompted me to apply to the court with a suit against the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

On 22 August 2003, the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv passed a judgment in Case No. 2-3365/2003, in which it pronounced the inactivity of the CMU in the aspect of securing safe environment for the life and health of citizens, ecological safety of natural environment along with nuclear and radiological safety as illegitimate. The Cabinet of Ministers was thereby obliged to undertake perfectly clear and understandable actions to ensure the solution of problems associated with the nuclear and radiological safety of the population. However, the Cabinet of Ministers evaded from the execution of judgment.

The current state of execution of the “Complex Programme of Modernization and Safety Enhancement in the Power-Generating Units of Atomic Stations” was considered on 06.04.2005 at the session of the Supreme Council Committee of Ukraine on the Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety. The parliamentary committee, by a unanimous decision, drew the attention of the CMU to the fact that execution of the “Complex Programme of Modernization and Safety Enhancement in the Power-Generating Units of Atomic Stations” had been disrupted. It suggested revising it with regard to specifying the priorities, which unconditionally had to secure the needed level of safety at the APS.

On 21.04.2005, First Vice-Prime Minister of Ukraine Anatoliy Kinakh gave a commission to the Minister of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine Ivan Plachkov, obliging the latter to “submit well-coordinated suggestions to the Cabinet of Ministers as to carrying-out of the decision of Committee on the Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety”. Nevertheless, further course of events revealed that the Ministry of Fuel and Energy did not lift a finger to implement the decision of the profile Supreme Council Committee and the instruction of one of the governmental leaders.

Consideration of the question “On the State of Execution of Measures in the “Complex Programme of Modernization and Safety Enhancement in the Power-Generating Units of Atomic Stations” at the session of SNRC on 07.04.2005 demonstrated that NAPGC “Energoatom” lays no emphasis on the execution of top-priority arrangements for safety enhancement.

The board of SNRC also pointed out that the activities of NAPGC “Energoatom” within 2003-2004 were predominantly targeted at securing economic indices instead of enhancing safety. Besides, the operating organization distanced itself from the coordination of actions for the carrying-out of monotonous measures related to safety enhancement in various power units (which would enable to save a considerable portion of public funds). The work of NAPGC “Energoatom” for the realization of arrangements prescribed by the “Complex Programme of Modernization and Safety Enhancement in the Power-Generating Units of Atomic Stations” was declared unsatisfactory by the board of SNRC.

In addition, it was suggested that the Ministry of Fuel and Energy consider the question of responsibility of the officials in NAPGC “Energoatom” for the disruption of safety measures, advisability of their further tenure of office and development of respective actions for the prevention of such practice in the future.

In compliance with the decision taken by SNRC board, NAPGC “Energoatom” was bound to submit, within a month’s period, proposals to SNRC regarding the correction of the “Complex Programme of Modernization and Safety Enhancement in the Power-Generating Units of Atomic Stations”, coordinated with the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, for the purpose of its adoption by the Cabinet of Ministers no later then September 2005. The CMU directed the Ministry of Fuel and Energy to fulfill its commissions by the same time.

However, in practice it turned out that the Ministry of Fuel and Energy never succeeded, during eight months, in preparing a new version of the “Complex Programme”, which would take into consideration the real state of affairs in the nuclear power engineering of Ukraine, the requirements of IAEA, international commitments of our state, decisions of the Supreme Council Committee of Ukraine on the Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety dated 06.04.2005 as well as those of SNRC board dated 07.04.2005.

Instead of a new edition of the “Complex Programme”, the necessity of which had been discussed on all levels of authority for almost a year, what the Ministry of Fuel and Energy put forward at the governmental session was… “Conception of Safety Enhancement in the Functioning Power Units of APS”. But in accordance with the explanatory dictionaries, the word “conception” denotes nothing more than a system of views on one or another phenomenon, a general notion thereof. No particular mechanisms or actions for securing the nuclear safety were put forward for discussion in this case. Therefore, it is equally impossible to discuss any public policy or control over the state of safety at APS, since nobody can supervise the execution of a conception.

This appears to be precisely what the management of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy is striving for (i.e. irresponsibility). It also seems that neither Ivan Plachkov not Yuriy Prodan (who presented the said document at the governmental session of 13.12.2005) realize that their unprofessionalism and irresponsibility can inflict a serious damage upon Ukraine.

As concerns the international commitments of Ukraine in the field of nuclear safety, here both Plachkov and Prodan are obviously behaving by the principle: “Where there is a document, there is a problem, where there is no document, there is no problem”. To my mind, there is no need to remind once more what such an irresponsible standpoint of management in this branch can lead to.

Finally, as the designed service life of the above power units (less than 10 years for a third of functioning APS) is actually approaching its expiry, no answer has been received as yet to the key question: can their service life be prolonged? No information is available as to any real measures enabling to receive such an answer, or the funds by which it will be financed. After all, the Fund for the Removal of APS Power Units from Service has never been created! In its place, we are only dealing with all kinds of “documentary fantasies”, telling us until which date it is desirable to prolong the resource. Moreover, different documents contain different figures – 5, 10, 12 or 15 years.

All the above-listed problems are by no means new. They have been ventilated both by me and by numerous nuclear specialists for a number of years already. So where is the real progress? If, owing to some reasons, it is still absent – then what keeps the managements of various ministries and administrations, empowered by the State to account for these questions, so busy?

Virtually, the only sphere in which more or less progress has been achieved is the legislative consolidation of a strict division of competences among different authorities responsible for making decisions as to the construction of nuclear and radiological hazardous objects.

In September 2005, having overcome an unbelievable resistance on the part of “groups of nuclear interests” and “tough economic bosses” from the atomic nucleus, the Supreme Council adopted a Law which was initiated by me, “Procedure of Making Decisions as to the Placement, Design and Construction of Nuclear Plants and Objects Intended for the Handling of Radioactive Waste of Nationwide Importance”.

The same “tough economic bosses” from the Ministry of Fuel and Energy and “Energoatom” made every effort to cause the President of Ukraine to veto the said law. It was a rather strenuous task to convince the top officials of the state that these attempts did not serve the country’s interests. I wonder how the advocates of veto and the political forces who supported them would look against the background of the “scandal of Ukrainian nuclear burial grounds”, which grew lush upon the yeast of the parliamentary election campaign? Anyway, it is precisely this law that we should thank for having an absolutely European, transparent, responsible and efficient procedure of decision-making as to the construction of nuclear and radiological hazardous objects, which does not permit any voluntaristic or thoughtless decisions in the said aspects.

I recommend that everyone who keeps an eye on the development of the current scandal around the results of tender for the construction of storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel at Ukrainian APS should read this law. I believe it will somewhat reduce the scope of their questions – since according to this law, such a construction cannot be started without the mandatory consent of the Supreme Council, and by no other way than adoption of a special law. Decision as to coordination of the placement of nuclear objects or storage facilities on their territories may be taken by local authorities no sooner than upon conducting an advisory referendum, whereas every construction project of such objects has to undergo a whole series of strict public examinations, be coordinated with the governments of adjacent countries etc.

We can see that the situation is far from simple. As regards the question of the expediency of building storage facilities for the SNF of Ukrainian origin in principle, this problem necessitates a serious and open discussion of all the interested parties: nuclear scientists, authorities, economists, ecologists and the community, on condition of obligatory scientific and technical support (so far, there is not a single scientific-and-technical institution in Ukraine specializing on the problems of SNF).

Only afterwards will it become possible to elaborate a strategic line of behaviour relative to the storage of SNF and nuclear waste on our territory. Besides, this question displays two facets, being both political and economic. In this connection, the attempts of certain interested stakeholders to operate the discussion using arguments ripped out of context appear especially alarming.

It is necessary to admit that the problem of efficiency of the SNF and RAW handling mechanism actually exists. And it needs to be solved in a public, transparent way, entirely within the Ukrainian legal space, with compulsory divulgation of information as to the diverse models of its solution, carrying-out of complex examinations and unconditional satisfaction of all requirements set forth by the ecological and radiological safety.

Proceeding from the documents available today to the Supreme Council Committee on the Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety, the construction of “largest European” storage facilities for SNF within 100 km from Kyiv presents itself, in my opinion, as hardly feasible.

And the final point. It is highly important for both the journalists and even more so for the politicians to avoid confusions in the terminology and concepts of the field of nuclear power engineering. When the Prime Minister speaks about the necessity of building three depositories for spent nuclear fuel on the territory of Ukraine, this should be understood as selection of one ground for the construction of SNWD out of three alternatives. And that may happen only after the carrying-out of mandatory and necessary examinations. Such are the requirements of the current legislation of Ukraine.

As becomes obvious, the field of nuclear power engineering is flooded with problems. And sheer desire to solve them is far from enough for successful work. A complex approach is indispensable. In view of the recent coming into force of the constitutional reform and the forthcoming adoption of this law by the Cabinet of Ministers, a brand-new effective system is required for the management of the fuel and energy complex on the whole and nuclear power engineering in particular. The existing model of management, oriented at “the present situation”, appointment of casual persons to executive positions, disregard of the country’s interests at the expense of those of party groups, “dear friends” etc. must be done away with.

One should always remember: the fuel and energy complex of contemporary Ukraine represents a complicated segment of economy, the problems of which cannot be solved without professionalism, responsibility and the ability to place the needs of people and society above one’s personal interests.

Andriy DERKACH, People’s Deputy of Ukraine,
Vice Chairman of the Supreme Council Committee on the Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety